A better way for Canada to help Flag-waving 'signature' projects have questionable value when programs designed and led by Afghans build much-needed loyalty for the government of Afghanistan, Nipa Banerjee writes. Nipa Banerjee, The Ottawa Citizen Published: Thursday, January 24, 2008 The Manley panel's recommendations on the continuation of Canada's armed presence in Afghanistan are not unexpected. The analysis with respect to the combat mission is sound, but the recommendations for how to improve Canada's contribution to development merit further debate. Of particular interest is the report's suggestion that Canada needs a "signature" development project such as a hospital. Politicians may like these sorts of flag-waving endeavours, but they are of questionable value. Email to a friend Printer friendly Font:****Canada's mission is to build peace and stability by enhancing the legitimacy and authority of the Afghan government across the country. Only this can rid the country of the chaos and turmoil caused by the Taliban. Such objectives require support on the security, governance and development fronts, and the key to success in these is leadership and ownership by the Afghan government. The national development programs designed and implemented by the Afghan government, which CIDA has supported, have generated positive results. They are beginning to improve the lives of Afghans, and are contributing to stability by building the people's loyalty to their own government. The beneficiaries of these programs support the Afghan government against Taliban incursions and protect villages from Taliban attacks, because the goods and services delivered through these national programs are considered public assets. Not a single school or road built by one of these national programs has been burned or sabotaged. Yet the Manley report recommends a shift to "bilateral project assistance." Traditional bilateral projects are designed and delivered by donor country contracts with private sector firms, and historically have attended much less to the needs of the citizens of the recipient country. In Afghanistan, any one Afghan-government identified program has earned more benefits for Afghans than all the CIDA-funded bilateral projects combined. In fact, there are examples of CIDA-funded non-government projects in Afghanistan with a Canadian mark on them that have failed dismally. A Canadian NGO created four female-operated radio stations, at a total cost of $3 million -- to what positive effect on women in Afghanistan remains unknown. Interestingly, almost all positive outcomes and achievements, noted by the commission in the report, involve national programs to which CIDA contributed. These did not flow out of bilateral projects. There is little evidence to support a conclusion that donor finances, when invested in such national programs, go astray just because these are managed by the Afghan government. One of the largest and most successful national programs is the National Solidarity Program. The World Bank addresses the accountability requirements for the donors in this program by retaining a full- time auditor/monitor. On the other hand, alleged corruption has not been rooted out from bilateral projects financed by some of the largest donors. The Canadian "signature" projects, such as a hospital in Kandahar, may warm Canadian hearts. But this will remain as an ostentatiously Canadian project, not something that will help enhance the visibility or presence of the Afghan government, or contribute to the achievement of our original objective of stabilization of Afghanistan. Instead, Canada should consider evidence-based programming. Past experience in fragile and conflict-ridden states includes plentiful examples of QIPs (Quick Impact Projects) turning into NIPs (No Impact Projects). This is because no matter how visible such quick action projects are, they are outcomes of disjointed and knee-jerk responses to issues that require strategic planning for sustainable long-term impact on security and stability. Email to a friend Printer friendly Font:****The quick action projects most often lack strategic vision. They do not promote the recipient government's fragile visibility and legitimacy and thus do not contribute to the state stabilization process. They might earn force or troop protection for a limited period, but they hardly contribute to longer term peace- and security-building. One such knee-jerk response proposed in the Manley report is the "possibility" of "a limited poppy-for-medicine project" -- a recipe for disaster in a country where growing of poppy is unconstitutional and where absence of the rule of law is such that the "limit" cannot be enforced. The one flaw in this report is its failure to recognize that the hearts and minds for which the battle is being waged are in Afghanistan, not Canada. A clear understanding of the objective of Canada's mission in Afghanistan will help stop the search for a project in Kandahar with a Maple Leaf pasted on its face. Nipa Banerjee served as the head of Canadian aid programs in Afghanistan (2003-06). She now teaches at the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Ottawa. She is also a CAIDC Member.
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